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A Fragment on Legal Innovation 
ANDREW TUTT† 
Starting in the mid-nineteen sixties through at least the
mid-nineteen eighties, if you were a Fortune 500 Company
about to become involved in a major takeover fight, your law
firm was either Skadden, Arps or Wachtell, Lipton1—and if 
it was not, you wished it were.2 These firms were mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) law’s most dominant players,3 a fact 
attributable to their willingness to engage in and defend 
against hostile takeovers, a practice which was then 
considered “dishonorable” by the white-shoe law firms of the 
day.4 They were firms teaming with talented lawyers, ready 
† Visiting Fellow, Yale Law School Information Society Project; Law Clerk,
Honorable Cornelia T.L. Pillard, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. To the editors of the Buffalo Law Review, especially Erin Connare, I
owe a debt of gratitude. Their splendid editing and enormous enthusiasm for this
Essay gave it a polish I never could have on my own. Thanks also to Robert W.
Gordon to whom it owes its existence. 
1. Eli Wald, The Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish Law Firms, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 1803, 1835 (2008); see also Steven Brill, Two Tough Lawyers in the Tender-
Offer Game, N.Y. MAG., June 21, 1976, at 52-53 (describing Colt Industries’
acquisition of Garlock, Inc.). 
2. MALCOLM GLADWELL, OUTLIERS: THE STORY OF SUCCESS 119 (2008); Brill,
supra note 1, at 53-55.
 3. See BRETT COLE, M&A TITANS: THE PIONEERS WHO SHAPED WALL STREET’S 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS INDUSTRY 58-63 (2008).
 4. Wald, supra note 1, at 1835; see also GLADWELL, supra note 2, at 124-25;
Eli Wald, The Rise of the Jewish Law Firm or is the Jewish Law Firm Generic?, 



































1002 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
and willing to use every legal tool at their disposal to win.5 
Skadden and Wachtell were filled with the most brilliant
lawyers from the most prestigious schools, who had been shut 
out of the white-shoe firms because they were Jewish.6 
The men who led the M&A practices at these firms, and 
worked the big cases, Joe Flom and Marty Lipton, were the
brightest of all.7 Joe Flom’s partners regarded him as “the
best lawyer of his generation” and “the finest in the second 
half of the twentieth century.”8 Flom’s nemesis, Marty 
Lipton, eight years Flom’s junior, was not far behind.9 Top of
his class at New York University Law School, a former 
Editor-in-Chief of the New York University Law Review, a
graduate of the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton
School,10 and “the merger industry’s leading philosopher,”11 
one can scarcely whisper the name Joe Flom without some 
mention of Marty Lipton trailing close behind.12 
Their talents and tenacity were legendary. Between 
them, these lawyers and the law firms they led crafted an 
enormous number of legal innovations.13 Skadden developed
new and aggressive takeover tactics, employing what had
been token corporate formalities to empower aggressive 
corporations to engage in hostile takeovers without the 
5. See LINCOLN CAPLAN, SKADDEN: POWER, MONEY, AND THE RISE OF A LEGAL
EMPIRE 8-10 (1993).
6. This racism was so intense and perverse that even Alexander Bickel—who 
would become “perhaps the finest constitutional scholar of his generation”—could
not get a job on account of his “antecedents.” GLADWELL, supra note 2, at 121-22;
see also id. at 121-29 (detailing “The Importance of Being Jewish”); COLE, supra
note 3, at 9. Skadden also had an unusually open culture, and welcomed
“castoffs . . . late bloomers and, if not misfits, then not quite smooth fits.” CAPLAN, 
supra note 5, at 47.
 7. See COLE, supra note 3, at 3, 18, 62.
 8. CAPLAN, supra note 5, at 3; see id. at 5-6.
 9. See Brill, supra note 1, at 52-53.
 10. COLE, supra note 3, at 18.
 11. Id. at 2.
 12. See CAPLAN, supra note 5, at 59; see also Brill, supra note 1, at 53.
 13. See Michael J. Powell, Professional Innovation: Corporate Lawyers and





























   
  
 
   
 
2014] LEGAL INNOVATION 1003 
approval of the targets’ corporate boards.14 Wachtell 
responded by making equally unprecedented use of
primordial mechanisms for arranging corporate
compensation, securitization, and organization to shut-down 
Skadden’s circumventions.15 These mechanisms for corporate
“defense”—golden parachutes, pac-man defenses, scorched 
earth retreats, shark repellants, and lock-ups—culminated 
in the “poison pill.”16 “[T]he poison pill was a legal innovation
that involved the issuance of new rights, or potential rights,
to shareholders of target corporations”17—widely considered 
among the most important developments in corporate law in
the latter-half of the twentieth century.18 
Skadden and Wachtell’s efforts transformed more than 
the arcane legal language within which corporate lawyers
argue about fine points of corporate law: their efforts 
radically transformed the substance of these social 
arrangements, from the structure of the capital markets to
the substantive relationship between boards, shareholders,
and management we see today.19 Skadden and Wachtell also 
changed the rules of engagement between law firms and their
corporate clients. Marketing their legal innovations to clients
as specialized tools designed to achieve specific ends, they 
14. See id. at 430 (describing Skadden’s frequent and daring use of the “hostile
tender offer” as a “deviant innovation utilized by outsiders to the main game on
Wall Street”).
 15. See id. at 433-35.
 16. See id. at 434.
 17. Id. at 429.
 18. See Ronald J. Gilson, Lipton and Rowe’s Apologia for Delaware: A Short
Reply, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 37, 37 (2002) (“Martin Lipton has a strong claim to
having devised the most important innovation in corporate law since . . . 1879.”);
Powell, supra note 13, at 429 (calling it “the most significant and controversial of
the several new defensive antitakeover devices that appeared during the mid-
1980s”); Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 779 
(2010) (calling the poison pill “one of the most important legal inventions”).
 19. See COLE, supra note 3, at 7-11 (describing the shift on Wall Street from a
culture focused on facilitating the aims of corporate clients to a culture focused









































1004 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
actively generated—or, in Wachtell’s case, policed—the 
market for corporate control.20 
Skadden and Wachtell, we are told, were something new
in the history of American corporate law. Though lawyers
and law firms had long played a dynamic role in the making 
of corporate law,21 before Skadden and Wachtell the role was 
primarily thought to be instrumental, not generative.22 
Lawyers helped corporations by guiding them and
implementing the corporation’s aims through the ritual of
legality, not by inventing new devices and legal instruments
of their own accord.23 As Robert Gordon has explained, from 
the post-Civil War period through the early twentieth
century—the era which saw the rise of enormous
corporations—“[f]or the most part, corporate lawyers did 
little more than select and in some instances devise the most
legally defensible and advantageous forms through which 
decisions already made could be executed.”24 This is not to say 
that such lawyers did not use every legal tool in their
toolboxes to pursue what Gordon describes as “economic 
warfare” against the laboring classes,25 but it does represent 
a substantively different conception of the role of the lawyer,
20. See Robert L. Nelson, The Futures of American Lawyers: A Demographic
Profile of a Changing Profession in a Changing Society, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
345, 351-52 (1994); Powell, supra note 13, at 423, 427, 448, 452 (describing this
fundamental shift); see also Brill, supra note 1, at 56.
 21. See BERYL HAROLD LEVY, CORPORATION LAWYER: SAINT OR SINNER? 26, 47
(1961); see also Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age
of American Enterprise, 1870-1920, in  PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL
IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983) [hereinafter Gordon, Legal 
Thought] (describing how lawyers contributed to lawmaking through the creation
of new legal practices and devices, such as tax shelters, new ownership and
leasing arrangements, new types of securities, and even new corporate forms).
 22. See  ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL
ORGANIZATION MAN? 160-67 (1964); Gordon, Legal Thought, supra note 21, at 78-
81.
 23. See Robert W. Gordon, The Role of Lawyers in Producing the Rule of Law:
Some Critical Reflections, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 441, 441-43, 453, 459, 466
(2010) (describing the distinction between rational-formal legality and
substantive liberality). 
24. Gordon, Legal Thought, supra note 21, at 78.





































2014] LEGAL INNOVATION 1005 
and the function of law, than the understanding Skadden and 
Wachtell are thought to have pioneered—that of the law firm
as a research and development lab for the creation and
refinement of “legal-technological innovation[s].”26 
But the idea that Skadden and Wachtell invented
corporate legal innovation may be largely a product of 
narrative chance. In the years before their rise, the elite bar 
shrouded its efforts to mold and shape corporate law beneath 
a thick layer of aristocratic civility. Outwardly, lawyers told
the world that their primary attributes were expertise and
dispassionate counsel. Elite corporate lawyers hewed to the 
rhetoric of “the lawyer as instrument” through at least the
middle twentieth century.27 In The Wall Street Lawyer, Erwin  
O. Smigel’s classic account of the culture in the era’s large
law firms, Smigel explained that Wall Street firms in the
forties and fifties thought of themselves as white knights
whose duty was to ensure that things ran smoothly for their
clients.28 But Smigel’s account was based almost entirely on 
what the lawyers in these firms told him their role was. Thus, 
the idea that lawyers were merely instruments may or may
not have been how lawyers actually perceived themselves,
but it was the picture of themselves they offered to the media 
and social historians.29 
This veneer of stoicism and traditionalism was easy to
maintain. After all, these lawyers all came from the same Ivy 
League schools, went to the same churches, summered at the 
same vineyards, and considered litigation and contestation 
26. Id. at 80 (“[I]t has yet to be established that . . . [legal-technological
innovation] was of primary causal significance in determining strategies and
structures of enterprise.”). 
27. See Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor
After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1209 (2003). 
28. See GLADWELL, supra note 2, at 124.
29. Erwin O. Smigel’s account is based on interviews. See SMIGEL, supra note
22, at 17-34. As for what these lawyers told the media, they were famously
discrete, but this has too often been taken to mean they were not aggressive
behind the scenes—in truth, we do not really know what happened behind the
scenes, which was precisely what these lawyers sought. See GLADWELL, supra note 
2, at 124; see also Robert A. Kagan et al., The Business of State Supreme Courts,








































   
 
1006 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
in the courts unseemly.30 Thus, to the outside world, large law
firms were not innovators, or even fearsome negotiators, but
talented legal accountants.31 According to Smigel, the large
law firms told him their primary task was to manage “the
enormous complexity of nationwide and foreign commerce 
under our federal system, the powers reserved to the several 
states and the perplexing congeries of laws under which we 
move and have our being.”32 If anything, corporate lawyers
were guardians of virtue who operated as a “brake” on
voracious corporate appetites.33 “Lawyers often use their
positions as advisors to guide their clients into what they
believe to be proper and moral legal positions” and serve “as 
the conscience of the businessman.”34 
This Victorian image—of corporate lawyers as little more
than elite tax preparers—persists today.35 As John C. Coffee, 
30. GLADWELL, supra note 2, at 122-25; see Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism 
as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 657, 674-
75 (1994).
 31. SMIGEL, supra note 22, at 161-62. Smigel’s account of the nature of the elite
corporate legal profession in the early twentieth century has been enormously
influential. One can scarcely find a source that does not cite his work prominently
at face value for the propositions that corporate lawyers saw themselves as
counselors and advisors whose primary purpose was the implementation of
corporate aims through ethical means. But Smigel’s account, as Smigel notes,
reflects the self-description of the professionals within the profession at the time,
and often at considerable temporal remove from the time they are describing. The
account in the The Wall Street Lawyer, in other words, is almost surely much
more of an elaborate rhetorical enterprise—a rosier and not altogether accurate
depiction of the nature, aims, and goings-on of the American legal profession of
the early twentieth century—than most scholars who rely on its attractively neat
and straightforward narrative suspect. 
32. Id. at 161 (quoting ARTHUR W. DEAN, WILLIAM NELSON CROMWELL, 1854-
1948: AN AMERICAN PIONEER IN CORPORATION, COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 83-85 (1957)); see also id. at 162 (“That much of the business of the large law
firms is complex and important is recognized by their legal staff and is
documented in the histories of law offices.”). 
33. Id. at 342 (“Their cautious use of societal brakes provides the liberal with 
time and opportunity to seek change in a relatively stable society. The 
revolutionary is thwarted because the keepers of the status quo do not allow the
seeds of deep discontent to flower.”).
 34. Id. at 6.
 35. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE

































2014] LEGAL INNOVATION 1007 
Jr., wrote in 2006 of the contemporary bar, corporate lawyers
are principally “transaction engineer[s]” whose “special skill”
is “drafting and disclosure,” more similar to “the accountant” 
than “the litigator/advocate.”36 Indeed to the extent that the
role of the corporate lawyer has changed, it has changed for 
the worse, as the kind of lawyer Smigel described— 
possessing both the power and independence to serve as an 
ethical check on corporate appetites—has slowly gone
extinct.37 All that is left of the Paleolithic corporate lawyer, in 
Coffee’s view, is the lawyer-accountant.38 
The mythos of American corporate law has thus come to
be dominated by an understanding that, until the rise of 
Skadden and Wachtell, lawyers in the private bar largely saw
themselves as agents of corporate interests, and clients 
largely perceived them as tools for the solving of social 
problems through the ceremony of legal custom and legal 
argument.39 Legal formalities were just that—formalities.
Private lawyers existed then, and to a large extent exist now,
more or less only to ensure that i’s are dotted and t’s are
crossed. At their best, they were merely instruments by
which decisions already made were implemented, justified,
and rationalized.40 In other words, before Skadden and 
Wachtell, lawyers in private law did not take into account
public values or ideological ends when they engaged in
litigation but rather made whatever arguments they could to 
more closely borders on that of the accountant than that of the
litigator/advocate.”). 
36. Id. at 192-93.
 37. Id. at 194-96.
 38. See id. at 195 (“Over the last 30 years, the legal profession has to a
considerable degree followed the business model of the accounting profession.”); 
see also id. at 195-97, 229-32.
 39. See, e.g., Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal 
Practice at War with the Profession and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L.  REV. 931, 941
(1993) (“The fact that lawyers innovate to compete has practically gone unnoticed
in writing about the legal profession.”); Powell, supra note 13, at 424 (“Sociological 
research on lawyers generally has followed two streams of development, neither
of which explicitly addresses the role of lawyers in developing and expanding the
law.”).
 40. See Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice As a Public Calling, 49 MD. 









































1008 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
zealously advance the narrow interests of their immediate
clients.
While there is much that is undoubtedly true in this
account, it seems to neglect something important about how
American lawyers throughout American history—outside, at
least, the early twentieth-century elite corporate bar—have
talked about themselves, the work they do, and the services 
they provide.41 American lawyers have long spoken in terms
that seem to envision themselves as something more than
sophisticated hammers. Lawyers have long branded 
themselves as something akin to legal-technological 
innovators—to borrow Robert Gordon’s construction42— 
whose professional role is to develop and invent remarkable
and ingenious legal solutions to otherwise intractable social,
political, economic, and legal puzzles even beyond the needs 
of their immediate clients.43 While it is certainly possible and
even likely that much of this narrative has been purely
rhetorical, there is a story to be told about legal innovation
before Skadden and Wachtell “invented” it. To understand
how and why this is, it is useful to go back to the birth of
modern commercial litigation more than two hundred years
ago. 
Before there was a Joe Flom or a Marty Lipton, even 
before there were law firms called Skadden or Wachtell,
there were William Blackstone and William Murray, First
Earl of Mansfield (who historians like to refer to as Lord 
41. But see Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in 
Lawyers’ Heads, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1498, 1498-1503 (1996) (arguing that most
lawyers and judges are legal formalists who “experience law as a process of logical
deduction” and that American jurisprudence fails to appreciate this because
“American jurisprudence has yet to recognize the law in lawyers’ heads.”). I 
dispute the premise that American lawyers have ever embraced or extolled
formalism over functionalism. I think history points toward an understanding
that formalism has only ever risen to ascendance in instances where it served 
functional ends. See, e.g., Gordon, Legal Thought, supra note 21, at 71.
 42. Gordon, Legal Thought, supra note 21, at 80.
 43. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman et al., Law, Lawyers, and Legal Practice
in Silicon Valley: A Preliminary Report, 64 IND. L.J. 555, 562 (1989); Mark C. 
Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the


































   
   










2014] LEGAL INNOVATION 1009 
Mansfield), a pair of English judges who profoundly
influenced the legal culture of the colonial United States.
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Law of England were
probably the most widely read legal text in the United States
between the late eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries.44 
As for Lord Mansfield, “[i]n this country . . . a pure
Mansfieldianism flourished: not only were his cases regularly
cited but his lighthearted disregard for precedent, his joyous 
acceptance of the idea that judges are supposed to make
law—the more law the better—became a notable feature of
our early jurisprudence.”45 
Both Blackstone and Mansfield were pragmatists who
saw law as something that should be, first and foremost,
concerned with consequences.46 Blackstone set his view of
legal rationality in a historical frame, arguing that the
development of the English Common Law reflected the
logical development of doctrines that had come close to the
perfection of reason precisely because it facilitated efficient
commercial intercourse and promoted overall social welfare.47 
44. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 30-31 (1967); DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE
LAW iii (1958) (“In the history of American institutions, no other book—except the 
Bible—has played so great a role . . . .”); id. at 3 (“In the first century of American
independence, the Commentaries were not merely an approach to the study of
law; for most lawyers they constituted all there was of the law.”); Albert W.
Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1996) (“Before 1900,
almost every American lawyer read at least part of Blackstone.”). The history 
presented here is necessarily stylized for brevity. More substantial works on the 
history of American legal thought and the American Legal Profession are
numerous. Useful primers are MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977) [hereinafter HORWITZ, 1780-1860], and MORTON
J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1870-1960 (1992).
 45. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 24 (1977) [hereinafter
GILMORE, AGES]. Mansfield served as the Chief Justice of the Court of King’s
Bench in England from 1756 to 1788. Id. at 114 n.5 (“His opinions are notable for
their salty wit, their almost complete irreverence for the past, and their 
extraordinary sensitivity to the actual practices of the mercantile community.”).
46. As I use pragmatism in this Essay, I mean roughly—though only roughly—
the sort of “evolutionary pragmatism” set out by Philip P. Wiener. See PHILIP P. 
WIENER, EVOLUTION AND THE FOUNDERS OF PRAGMATISM 174-89 (1949).
 47. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *74, *260-61, *273.
Blackstone repeatedly throughout his Commentaries refers to the study of law as

































1010 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
Mansfield put these Blackstonian principles into practice. 
While he had no respect for the traditions or the precedents
of the Common Law, he took the notion that judges should 
conform to commercial law as nearly as possible seriously.48 
In his time as Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench, he 
often called together merchant juries that he consulted to
decide commercial disputes.49 
Because they wrote and understood law in this way,
Blackstone in his Commentaries and Mansfield in his cases
both shaped the American understanding of law as its system
began to take form, and also reflected the pragmatism and
scientificism that was already emerging and overtaking
English and American legal thought.50 In other words, these
pragmatic English legal roots mean that “American lawyers 
are and always have been rationalizers, generalizers, 
theorists—metaphysicians, we might say, manqués.”51 
American lawyers from the very first have cared far less for 
precedent than consequence, and far more for experience
than principle.52 By 1820, American lawyers and judges 
treated the common law as an instrument for the promotion 
of progress, on equal footing with legislation in importance 
and prestige.53 This “emphasis on law as an instrument of 
policy encouraged innovation and allowed judges to
formulate legal doctrine with the self-conscious goal of
bringing about social change.”54 
But crediting the judges alone takes far too narrow a
view. The creation of this understanding of the uses of the 
American common law emerged from a legal profession 
48. Lochlan F. Shelfer, Note, Special Juries in the Supreme Court, 123 YALE
L.J. 208, 213-15 (2013).
 49. Id.; GILMORE, AGES, supra note 45, at 114 n.5 (“Mansfield established a
‘jury’ of London merchants and was accustomed to seek their advice on mercantile
custom and practice in commercial cases.”). 
50. See, e.g., HORWITZ, 1780-1860, supra note 44, at 2; Gordon, Legal Thought, 
supra note 21, at 82; see also GILMORE, AGES, supra note 45, at 6-7, 10. 
51. GILMORE, AGES, supra note 45, at 10.
 52. See HORWITZ, 1780-1860, supra note 44, at 24.
 53. Id. at 30.









































   
2014] LEGAL INNOVATION 1011 
steeped in Blackstone and awed by Mansfield. Lawyers saw
themselves as part of a grand common law tradition, the
strength of which had always been “the doggedness, always
insensitive and often unscrupulous, with which ideas ha[d]
been used as weapons” whose vitality lay in “the unceasing 
abuse of its elementary ideas.”55 Lawyers of the time were 
merciless law abusers. To give just one example, future Chief 
Justice Marshall, in his only appearance before the United
States Supreme Court in Ware v. Hylton—probably one of the 
most important cases in American history, settling once and
for all that the federal government could do whatever was
necessary to effectuate the 1783 Treaty of Paris with Great
Britain—appealed almost exclusively to the Supreme Court’s
sense of justice and fairness in arguing that his client, the
defendant debtor Hylton, should not be made to pay the same
debt twice.56 He lost, but he argued boldly from consequence,
not doctrine.57 
As English and American law and lawyers grew apart,
American pragmatism took on a life of its own. Chancellor
Kent, America’s Blackstonian disciple (a famed Judge, Law
Professor at Columbia University, and probably the most 
influential American treatise writer of the 1830s onward58),
“devoted much of his career to overcoming populist impulses
in legal administration and to justifying the continued
55. S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW xi (1969). 
56. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 213 (1796). Luckily for future generations
of proud Americans, the Supreme Court rejected his view four to one. Id. at 220-
85 (giving the opinions of each of the Justices seriatim). Only Justice Iredell
agreed that fairness to the litigant outweighed the national interest in fulfilling
its treaty commitments. Id. at 280 (opinion of Iredell, J.) 
57. Of Marshall’s considerable lawyerly daring, Thomas Jefferson withheld no 
scorn: “So great is his sophistry, you must never give him an affirmative answer,
or you will be forced to grant his conclusion. Why, if he were to ask me if it were
daylight or not, I’d reply, ‘Sir, I don’t know, I can’t tell.’” 1 DIARY AND LETTERS OF
RUTHERFORD BIRCHARD HAYES: NINETEENTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
1834-1860, at 116 (Charles Richard Williams ed., 1922).
 58. John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 547, 564-66 (1993) (noting that Kent’s Commentaries went 
through fourteen editions and that “Kent died rich enough [from book royalties]






































1012 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
validity of the English common law in the new republic.”59 
Kent advocated English Common Law for the same reason
Blackstone did—“the English decisions were pronounced by 
Judges of vastly higher erudition and skill in the knowledge
of the common law.”60 More learned, their decisions were 
more likely to be in the public interest.  
Meanwhile, Mansfield’s great American acolyte, Justice
Joseph Story,61 continued to preach the cause of
consequentialism in all three of his great juridical roles: as a
Justice on the Supreme Court, a prolific writer of treatises, 
and as the Dane Professor of Law at Harvard (at a time—the 
1830s—when the Harvard Law Faculty consisted almost
entirely of the Dane Professor of Law at Harvard).62 Story’s
writings hold up a powerful mirror to their time. Story’s
ideology was as much a product as a driver of an American 
legal culture that bore an intensely pragmatic hue. By 1850,
“[l]aw, once conceived of as protective, regulative,
paternalistic and, above all, a paramount expression of the
moral sense of the community, had come to be thought of as
facilitative of individual desires[.]”63 
American law retained this techno-instrumentalist
flavor even during the era of formalism that lasted from 
roughly the middle nineteenth into the early twentieth 
century. The very ideologies that Blackstone, Mansfield, and
Story had sown into American law enabled the era’s excesses.
“It was Story himself, when he took over at Harvard in the
1840s, who reduced the content of legal science to private 
law” excluding “politics, legislation, civil law, international
59. Id. at 568 (footnote omitted).
60. Letter from James Kent to Simeon Baldwin, (n.p.) [Poughkeepsie] (July 18,
1786) (Yale Univ. Manuscripts & Archives, Baldwin Family Papers, Gen.
Correspondence, Group 55, Series I, Box 3, Folder 48).
 61. GILMORE, AGES, supra note 45, at 24.
 62. See id. at 119 n.11; Michael von der Linn, Harvard Law School’s 
Promotional Literature, 1829-1848: A Reflection of the Ideals and Realities of the
Story-Ashmun-Greenleaf Era, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 427, 427 n.1 (2010). 
63. See HORWITZ, 1780-1860, supra note 44, at 253. Though this frenzied 
development had carried with it its own unexpected normative baggage. As
Horwitz continues in the quoted passage above, law had also come to be seen “as





























   
  
   
   
2014] LEGAL INNOVATION 1013 
law, and liberal learning” from the Harvard curriculum.64 
Without realizing it, the idea that lawyers should use the law 
as a tool for legal innovation had become detached from any 
kind of training in what, precisely, the law-tool was meant to
achieve. This was “a vulgarized version of Whig legal science,
shorn of its pretension to elegance, public statesmanship, and
Ciceronian virtue”65—weapons training without a course on 
chivalry. 
The important takeaway is that legal innovation never
slowed even as ideas about the ends of law radically
transformed. Indeed, if anything, the rise of the new legal 
science in the 1870s and 1880s meant that law became even
more instrumental. As the nation (or perhaps only the
professional classes) increasingly embraced radical-
libertarianism, “laissez-faire economics and late nineteenth-
century legal theories” became “blood brothers.”66 Lawyers
working at the time not only felt no compunction casting off
seven hundred years of English precedent (as they had been
busy doing for the preceding century), but they found a way
to cast off even those innovations that had been developed in 
the preceding decades by rival conceptions of public virtue.67 
In a McLuhan-esque maneuver, formalist lawyers of the era
managed this transformation by asserting that the medium
was the message68: their outcomes—the preservation of
liberty, the freedom to contract, the godhood of markets— 
were the outcomes deducible from social science.
Unsurprisingly, these lawyers concluded they were also the
outcomes deducible from legal science. Formalism was just
another way of doing what American lawyers had been doing
64. Gordon, Legal Thought, supra note 21, at 87.
 65. Id.
 66. GILMORE, AGES, supra note 45, at 66.
 67. See id. at 60-64. Though Gilmore does not explicitly recognize that this era
of formalism actually implemented the public values ascendant at the time, he
does explain admirably how it implemented the values it did.
 68. See generally  MARSHALL MCLUHAN & LEWIS H. LAPHAM, UNDERSTANDING
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for the preceding hundred years—creating legal 
innovations.69 
Like a map of a large and complex terrain, the foregoing
is necessarily an abstraction, including only the most
essential features. Nonetheless, the takeaway of this brief
account is meant to be merely this: American lawyers have
possessed a kind of shadow-ideology since the founding—a
self-perception that they are destined to be legal innovators.70 
Even as the modes and methods of argument have changed, 
and one formal understanding of the nature of law and legal 
argument has given way to another, lawyers have seen
themselves and their role as that of creators of legal devices
that benefit the public interest.
Moreover, as this brief survey reveals, legal innovation
serves not only immutable interests (if there be any at all)
but far more often serves ephemeral interests.71 As Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in the opening lines of The
Common Law in 1881—at the height of the era of legal 
formalism—it is “the felt necessities of the time, the
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public
policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which
judges share with their fellow-men” that determine the rules 
by which men are governed.72 This phrase takes on new 
meaning if one thinks of Holmes not as an outsider but as a 
participant in an ongoing self-conscious process of legal 
innovation. In that light, The Common Law is not so much a 
critique of formalism, as it is often taken to be,73 as an
engagement with it. Formalism was just another way of 
implementing social policy, and Holmes was promoting a
69. See Gordon, Legal Thought, supra note 21, at 91-110. 
70. The account could continue on into the early twentieth century, and
perhaps in a later instantiation of this project it might, but for present purposes
an account of the nation’s first hundred years seems enough to highlight the 
trend. 
71. See Robert W. Gordon, The Path of the Lawyer, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1013,
1016 (1997).
 72. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
 73. See, e.g., MORTON GABRIEL WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE
REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM 15-18 (Beacon Press 1957) (1949) (casting Holmes’s
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different way—devising, as it were, his own legal
innovations.74 
One legal innovation in particular still persists, which is
the separation of contract and morals—an innovation that
was litigated and ultimately fully entrenched in American 
legal thought by the end of the nineteenth century.75 This 
legal innovation was the product of the private bar—lawyers 
working as lawyers—and it ultimately subsumed and 
replaced existing legal doctrines. Now, we take it for granted, 
though at the time of its formulation it marked a significant
break with the past. 
The idea of a transubstantive set of principles for the
governance of all promises—that is, the very idea of contract 
as a unitary doctrinal field—is itself a legal innovation of 
relatively recent vintage.76 Though it was not crafted by the
practicing bar, but rather fashioned by Christopher
Columbus Langdell, then the Dean at Harvard Law School
in the 1870s.77 
This is not to say contract did not exist. Quite the
opposite. There have been promises the law would enforce
since the very earliest recorded history. But which promises 
the law would enforce and under what circumstances and 
how remained remarkably fluid for much of that history. In 
what may be among the oldest surviving reported cases in
the history of the common law, the Court of Saint Albans
Abbey awarded specific performance of a marriage contract 
in Walter v. William Thomas in 1247.78 Today, you are lucky
74. See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 66
(1984) [hereinafter Gordon, Critical Legal Histories]. 
75. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 708, 710 (2007) (explaining that in modern American contract law
there is a “substantive divergence between legal norms and moral norms . . . .”). 
76. Rafael Chodos, Fiduciary Law: Why Now? Amending the Law School
Curriculum, 91 B.U. L. REV. 837, 841 (2011). 
77. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 6 (1974) [hereinafter GILMORE, 
DEATH OF CONTRACT].
78. Court Rolls of St. Albans Abbey (1247), in ADA E. LEVITT, STUDIES IN
MANORIAL HISTORY 329-330 (1930), reprinted in  JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF 
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if you can get specific performance for any kind of contract.79 
Nonetheless, the question of whether breaching a
contract possessed a moral dimension remained an open one
in the law of contracts well into the nineteenth century.80 The 
first recorded American case awarding punitive damages in
either tort or contract was a New Jersey case in 1791, Coryell
v. Colbaugh, involving the breach of a promise to marry.81 
The trial judge told the jury:
[T]hey were not to estimate the damages by any particular proof of
suffering or actual loss; but to give damages for example’s sake, to
prevent such offences in future . . . . [He] told the jury they were 
bound to no certain damages, but might give such a sum as would
mark their disapprobation, and be an example to others.82 
To anyone schooled in the modern American law of
contracts, this result is stupendous. As Holmes famously 
stated in 1897, “[t]he duty to keep a contract at common law
means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not 
keep it,—and nothing else.”83 And by damages, Holmes meant
compensatory damages: “[i]f you commit a tort, you are liable
to pay a compensatory sum. If you commit a contract, you are
79. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1145, 1153 (1970) (“Our courts, like those of civil law countries, will not
undertake to coerce a performance that is personal in nature—to compel an artist
to paint a picture or a singer to sing a song.”). Imagine trying to force a marriage.
 80. See Kevin M. Teeven, A Legal History of Binding Gratuitous Promises at
Common Law: Justifiable Reliance and Moral Obligation, 43 DUQ. L.  REV. 11, 11 
(2004) (“Over the past two centuries, formalist judges and commentators have
tried in vain to suffocate the reliance and moral obligation alternatives to a
monist bargain test of promissory liability.”).
81. 1 N.J.L. 77, 77 (1791). 
82. Id. at 77-78. It might well be remembered though that the Supreme Court
of New Jersey in 1791 left something to be desired in the realm of professional 
training, counting among its three member Justices a physician who “had no legal 
education and had never practised law.” See John Whitehead, The Supreme Court
of New Jersey, 3 GREEN BAG 401, 404 (1891). The Justices were Richard Stockton,
a prominent Federalist Lawyer, James Kinsey, a Quaker Lawyer whose father
had actually been Chief-Justice of Pennsylvania, and Isaac Smith, the
aforementioned physician, of whom “very little can be said.” Id. at 402, 404, 406. 
























   
 
 












2014] LEGAL INNOVATION 1017 
liable to pay a compensatory sum . . . .”84 This, in Holmes 
estimation, was the common law rule, notwithstanding “such 
a mode of looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils of those
who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the law 
as they can.”85 
This is quite a different rule than that which obtains in
civil law nations where the rule is pacta sunt servanda 
(“contracts must be honored”).86 But it was also thought to be 
quite a different rule than that which had obtained in
common law nations when Holmes said it.87 Until about the 
mid-nineteenth century, just as there was no law of
contracts, the common law had no fixed rules about the duty
one owed not to breach a contract, or how to measure 
damages for breach. English authorities had held since the
eighteenth century that damages in a contract case could be
measured by the wrongfulness of the breach,88 and there were 
dozens of decisions in the United States that saw contract as
a moral obligation and breach as a wrong.89 Damage awards, 
84. Id.
 85. Id.
 86. Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Why No “Efficient Breach” in the Civil Law?: A
Comparative Assessment of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach of Contract, 55 AM. J.  
COMP. L. 721, 723 (2007).
87. Immediately after Holmes said it, the most Prominent Treatise writers on
Contracts on both sides of the Atlantic harshly criticized it as inconsistent with 
their own theories of the rule of contract damages and moral obligation required
by the common law. See WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF
CONTRACT 8-10 (2d ed. 1882) (this discussion only appears in the second edition,
as Anson chose to marginalize Holmes’s argument in later editions, shoving him
into a footnote); FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF  CONTRACT AT LAW AND IN
EQUITY xix-xx (3d ed. 1881).
 88. See, e.g., 2 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 4 (1736) (“In
all Actions which sound in Damages, the Jury seem to have a discretionary Power
of giving what Damages they think proper; for tho’ in Contracts the very Sum 
specified and agreed on is usually given, yet if there are any Circumstances of
Hardship, Fraud or Deceit, tho’ not sufficient to invalidate the Contract, the Jury
may consider of them and proportion and mitigate the Damages
accordingly . . . .”).
 89. See Teeven, supra note 80, at 67 (“The case reports are replete with moral 
obligation decisions, and Mansfield’s moral obligation cases were regularly cited
throughout the century.”); see, e.g., Vance v. Wells, 8 Ala. 399, 399 (1845); Cook
v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57, 57 (1828); Ellicott v. Turner, 4 Md. 476, 477 (1853); State,
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as Coryell v. Colbaugh demonstrates, were jury questions.90 
How much the victim of a contract breach valued the
performance promised was thought to be a case-by-case 
estimation as difficult to make as the estimation of the value
for a tort injury.91 
Enterprise lawyers found the state of contract damages
in the United States and in England untenable. Uncertainty
from the unpredictable nature of jury awards for contract
breaches coupled with a rule that made their clients perform
or pay more than compensation damages were
unacceptable.92 Thus, beginning in the mid-eighteenth
century they made two important legal innovations. They
convinced judges to exercise strict control over jury awards, 
and to limit those awards to compensatory economic 
damages.93 Contract was about commerce, these attorneys 
urged, not redress.94 
95Hadley v. Baxendale,  decided in 1854, is the 
contemporary emblem of this relatively recent innovation. 
544, 549 (1850); Nixon v. Jenkins, 1 Hill 318, 318 (N.Y. 1857); Early v. Mahon, 19
Johns. 147, 147 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821); Hatchell v. Odom, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.)
302, 306-07 (1836); Clark v. Herring, 5 Binn. 33, 38 (Pa. 1812); Greeves v.
McAllister, 2 Binn. 591 (Pa. 1809); McMorris v. Herndon, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 56,
56 (1830); Glass v. Beach, 5 Vt. 172, 172 (1833).
 90. See, e.g., Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the 
Industrialization of the Law, J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 255 (1975) (noting that “the
calculation of damages in contracts suits . . . had previously been left to almost
entirely unstructured decision by English juries” and that the preeminent treatise
of the time devoted only thirteen of its 771 pages to damages). 
91. See J. CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 768 (8th
ed. 1851).
 92. See Danzig, supra note 90, at 273; Timothy J. Sullivan, Punitive Damages
in the Law of Contract: The Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L.  
REV. 207, 211-12, 223 (1977). This discontent with the unpredictability of jury
awards was traceable to at least the mid-seventeenth century. See, e.g., Sullivan, 
supra, at 211-12.
 93. See, e.g., Hoy v. Gronoble, 34 Pa. 9, 10-12 (1859).
 94. CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA 1815-
1846 47 (1991) (“[T]he decisive reshaping of the law to the demands of the market 
was being accomplished by lawyers and judges, both Federalist and Republican,
in the state courts. Lawyers were the shock troops of capitalism.”).
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The case adopted both the substantive limitation on damages
and the procedural innovation the private bar so desperately
sought.96 As Richard Danzig has written of Hadley v.
Baxendale—a case that “is still, and presumably always will
be, a fixed star in the jurisprudential firmament”97—“[t]he
novelty of the changes effected in procedural and substantive
law by Hadley v. Baxendale suggests that the opinion may be
examined as an invention” for the “innovation effected in the 
law is here unusually stark.”98 
At the same time, across the Atlantic, American 
attorneys in every state were advancing the same arguments, 
often winning,99 and making it the law.100 Their arguments 
were neither particularly subtle nor even particularly good.
As one scholar put it, the early cases are nearly impossible to
study because they both lack citations and, for the most part, 
lack any justifications either.101 Hadley v. Baxendale is itself 
a prime example. “Baron Alderson, in support of the central 
proposition he advanced, cited no precedent and invoked no 
British legislative or academic authority in favor of the rule 
he articulated.”102 What he did do, however, was adopt the
argument of Baxendale’s counsel almost wholesale.103 
In Texas, the year before Justice Holmes wrote his 
famous formulation that contract breach had no moral 
96. Danzig, supra note 90, at 253-54.
 97. GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT, supra note 77, at 83.
 98. Danzig, supra note 90, at 254. 
99. But they did not always win. The rule was still in flux. See, e.g., Rose v.
Beatie, 11 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 538, 543 (1820).
 100. See, e.g., Snow v. Grace, 25 Ark. 570, 573 (1869); Butler v. Moore, 68 Ga. 
780, 781 (1882); Goins v. W. R.R. of Alabama, 68 Ga. 190, 192 (1881); Massie v.
Baily, 33 La. Ann. 485, 488 (1881); Ryder v. Thayer, 3 La. Ann. 149, 150 (1848);
Porter v. Barrow, 3 La. Ann. 140, 140 (1848) (formulating a rule nearly identical
to that set forth in Hadley v. Baxendale without any citation); Arrowsmith v.
Gordon, 3 La. Ann. 105, 109 (1848) (formulating a similar Baxendale-esque rule); 
Hoy v. Gronoble, 34 Pa. 9, 11 (1859); McCauley v. Long & Co., 61 Tex. 74, 79
(1884); Houston & T.C. R.R. Co. v. Shirley, 54 Tex. 125, 142 (1880); Gordon v.
Brewster, 7 Wis. 355, 359 (1858). 
101. See Sullivan, supra note 92, at 221-22.
 102. Danzig, supra note 90, at 254. 
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component, the Texas Supreme Court gave an unusually
candid justification for the rule, on the very grounds for 
which it had been advanced—not on the basis of any 
precedent or superiority of argument, but on the urging of its 
necessity and benefit to society. “If, in ordinary litigation on 
contracts, issues as to motives and exemplary damages be
allowed, the result would be greatly to increase the intricacy 
and uncertainty of such litigation”—ergo—“[t]he exclusion of 
such issues in suits on contract may be justified on the policy
of limiting the uncertainties and asperities attending
litigation of such issues.”104 
The received wisdom of this legal innovation, and
certainly how it was expressed by lawyers at the time, was 
that it was necessary to effectuate the needs of modern
industrial society.105 It must be emphasized that this was 
believed by all to be in the public interest.106 But it is equally
worth noting that contrary to the received wisdom, private
lawyers were making these arguments, and winning these
cases long before they were the gospel of the academy or even
the judiciary.107 Accounts that place Langdell and Holmes at
the center of the theory of efficient breach overlook that their
insights lagged the private practice of the profession by
nearly half a century.108 Now, it is so firmly entrenched in
American law that contract breach possesses no moral
dimension that the ordinary lawyer may scarcely realize it
was ever otherwise.109 
104. Houston & T.C. R.R. Co., 54 Tex. at 142. But see Sullivan, supra note 92, 
at 220-21 (critiquing this justification). 
105. Farnsworth, supra note 79, at 1216 (noting that “[a]ll in all, our system of
legal remedies for breach of contract” is “heavily influenced by the economic
philosophy of free enterprise”).
 106. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE LEGAL
HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN 1836-1915, at 285 (1964); E.
Allan Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An Historical Introduction to Contract, 
69 COLUM. L. REV. 576, 599 (1969). 
107. See Richard E. Speidel, An Essay on the Reported Death and Continued
Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1162-64 (1975). 
108. See id.
 109. See Farnsworth, supra note 79, at 1146-47. Of course, moral objections to
counseling clients to breach contracts remain. See  PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY
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What makes the contract innovation remarkable,
however, was that it expressed a professional concern with 
legal innovation apart from the purely instrumental
interests of immediate clients. As Professor Danzig
discovered about Hadley v. Baxendale, the reason that the
case became ascendant was not merely its revolutionary
character or its suitability to the time: 
There was another factor at play which has been lost sight of by
modern observers. [Baxendale’s lawyer] Sir James Shaw
Willes . . . to whom I have ascribed much of the responsibility for 
the invention in the case, appears to have been remarkably situated
to effect the marketing of the invention by virtue of his position as 
co-editor of the foremost legal textbook of the time: Smith’s Leading 
Cases. Yet more remarkably—and this underscores the already
mentioned intimacy of the mid-century British legal world—Willes’
opposing counsel on appeal (and the counsel for the Hadleys at 
trial), Sir Henry Singer Keating, was the other editor of Smith’s. 
The two “editors” wasted no time in converting their litigation 
arguments into an academic analysis, so that a primary difference 
between the 1852 edition of Smith’s Leading Cases and the 1856
edition was a lengthy description of and commentary on Hadley v. 
Baxendale.110 
Which brings us full circle to the legal innovation that
opened this Essay—the poison pill developed by Marty 
Lipton and his law firm, Wachtell. As Michael J. Powell
explained in his seminal essay on Legal Innovation detailing
the creation of the poison pill, as important as the poison pill
was as an object of considerable lawyerly ingenuity, equally 
important was that “Lipton himself promoted the poison pill 
in client memoranda, interviews and addresses to lawyers,”111 
and he and his firm continued to push the pill in every forum
and venue they could.112 It was not just the fact of the
innovation, but the ingenuity and enthusiasm of its diffusion 
that made the poison pill a legal innovation we still know and
remember. 
The point of the foregoing is to highlight the way legal
innovations dot the landscape of American history. The
 110. Danzig, supra note 90, at 275. 
111. Powell, supra note 13, at 439. 
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enormous changes in tort law beginning in the late
eighteenth century and continuing on into the twentieth 
relating to industrial accidents and workplace safety possess 
their own compelling story, as does the shift from “caveat
emptor” to strict liability for product defects.113 But given just
the small amount that can be gleaned from the accounts 
given here, what might we say about legal innovation?
First, the conventional account of the development of
American law is that it is a body of rules that developed
through processes of accretion and gradual accumulation
toward a preordained “optimal” set of rules for society’s social 
relations.114 One might be tempted to think that legal 
innovation fits this model: that legal innovation is inevitable
and that therefore all that has been described herein is the 
doctrinal-legal evolution of our legal system toward its
inevitable optimal structure.
But that surely cannot be so. That lawyers in the United
States developed the idea that contract should be a unitary
field, and should be the instrument of the implementation of
efficient legal relations, was as much a product of creativity
of private lawyers as the poison pill was more than a century
later. With the benefit of hindsight, every historical
development is guaranteed. But the truth is that the lawyers 
who decided that contract and morals would hereafter be
distinct created that idea, brought it to the courts, and
diffused it through the legal system of which they were a
part.
Second, it seems equally clear that legal innovations
really do begin with lawyers, and their ideas about public
virtue and the ends that might be attained by law. This has 
long been a whispered sort of wisdom among legal historians
about the nature of the development of law, but it never had
much support. Legal historians have long asserted that 
lawyers shaped the decisions of corporations in the Age of
American Enterprise by crafting ingenious legal arguments, 
113. See generally  JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED
WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2004).
 114. See Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, supra note 74, at 59-67 (1984) 
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and thereby generating solutions to the real-world problems
of corporate law through their own ingenuity.115 This account 
was easy to suggest, but there never was much concrete 
evidence that the lawyer’s efforts caused the innovations.116 
There was, if anything, more evidence pointing the other
way.117 Corporations demanded outcomes, and lawyers tried 
to deliver them. 
But this Essay illustrates that lawyer-driven legal
innovation is a real phenomenon at least some of the time. 
For innovation in contract is not like innovation on behalf of
a corporate client. Nineteenth-century lawyers innovating in 
the area of contract and representing small claimants in one-
off transactions, unlike corporate lawyers, had little vested
interest in thoroughly shaping the law of contract damages 
to serve their clients’ immediate interests. In the generalist 
one-lawyer era in which modern contract doctrine was set 
down, a lawyer’s client might have been the defendant in a
contract action in the morning and a plaintiff in a contract 
action in the afternoon. As such, we can make a claim, at
least with respect to innovation in contract, that the source 
of contract innovation was the lawyers. 
Finally, we might ask whether we should encourage or 
discourage legal innovation, or if that is even a meaningful
question, or even if it is a meaningful question whether it is 
a question we can meaningfully answer.118 Legal innovations,
as this Essay has shown, can become unproductive, useless—
even dangerous—in the blink of an eye. But one might
contend that the solution to too much outmoded legal
innovation is more innovation. In a culture of legal
experimentalism we would more often see competition to
implement values which most closely align with the values of 
our own time, and our own society—or at least the
115. See, e.g., Gordon, Legal Thought, supra note 21, at 78-81.
 116. Id. at 81.
 117. Id. at 78.
 118. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 
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professional lawyering class.119 Coupled with federalism,
robust encouragement of legal innovation might also be the
only means of truly fulfilling the promise of Louis Brandeis’s
ideal of the States as laboratories.120 Lawyers who take their 
states’ legal systems too far off the beaten path risk the loss
of prestige that accompanies the exodus of souls to other
states. 
But should we worry about “democratic degradation”—
that decisions of such great consequences are being carved in
the law’s interstices rather than in the open chambers of our
legislative institutions?121 There is much to be said for this 
view, but it misses an important fact, which is that law is
always there. We are never without it. And it is always
becoming.122 Thus, the question is really narrower than the 
democratic degradation account suggests. The real question
is whether lawyers should attempt to carve their own ideals
into the law through the vehicle of legal devices and private 
litigation, or merely make whatever arguments serve their
clients’ immediate interests. And given that choice, it seems 
inevitable that lawyers will choose to express their values—
the question is merely how boldly and how creatively they are
willing to do so. 
Should we encourage legal innovation or be wary of it?
Should we hope to see the law firm of the future with a robust
Research and Development arm, pumping out new contract
devices, securities, derivatives, and mechanisms for shifting
liability from clients to customers, or should we instead hope
that law firms resist innovation and favor uniformity and
stability? These question do have answers. We should
119. See John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 
86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (2007).
 120. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); see also James A. Gardner, The “States-As-Laboratories” Metaphor in 
State Constitutional Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 475 (1996) (explaining the history
and import of Brandeis’s metaphor).
 121. Cf. MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 33-51 (2012) (expressing the same concern due to
boilerplate contracts). 
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encourage legal innovation, and as much of it as we can get
away with. But we should realize that lawyers make public 
policy through their private work as lawyers, and therefore 
the way we train our private lawyers will ultimately decide 
the quality and quantity of legal innovation our society
receives. Perhaps then, this Essay merely concludes with a 
truth wise lawyers have always told us: “[i]n the last 
analysis, the law is what the lawyers are.”123 
123. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law School, to Julius
Rosenwald, Philanthropist (May 13, 1927) (on file with the Harvard Law School
library), quoted in RAND JACK & DANA CROWLEY JACK, MORAL VISION AND
PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS 
156 (1989).
